Αναδημοσίευση από roarmag

Ενδιαφέρον κείμενο για την τρέχουσα συγκυρία στην Αίγυπτο:

Egypt’s revolutionary process is a complicated convolution of people power and military co-optation. To succeed, it will have to take on the army anew.

Now that President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood have been forced from power, one question appears to be burning on everyone’s lips: is this Egypt’s second revolution, or is it really just a coup d’étât? Anyone outside of Egypt who still pretends to have a straightforward answer to this question is either lying or deluding themselves. The truth is that periods of grave revolutionary upheaval never lend themselves to simplistic binary narratives. If anything, the answer is neither: this is neither a second revolution nor a coup d’étât. Why?

First of all, it’s not a second revolution because — as I pointed out at length in a recent essay — revolutions are not events but processes. In Egypt’s case, this process first revealed itself on January 25, 2011 and remains ongoing until today. For a major newspaper like The Guardian to write about “post-revolutionary” Egypt therefore seems bizarre; and note that The Guardian is far from alone in propagating this kind of widespread discourse. Indeed, the struggle for the soul of the Egyptian revolution only seems to have intensified over the past 2,5 years as various forces — the Muslim Brotherhood, the army, the US government — have sought to co-opt it.

Seen in this light, Egypt’s revolution has been marked by three main phases: the initial insurrection of January and February 2011 that toppled Mubarak; the second wave of protests that forced the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (SCAF) to finally call elections; and now the third uprising of June 30 — the “Rebellion” — that forced Morsi out of office. It is absolutely crucial not to underestimate the role of popular agency in these world-historic events. As I wrote earlier, none of this would have been possible without the power of the street.

But there is a major caveat here. While the Egyptian revolution surely constitutes one of the most epic insurrectionary episodes in recent history, the “material constitution” of Egyptian society has changed remarkably little since the overthrow of Mubarak. When the people of Egypt initially rose up in January 2011, they rebelled against a deeply entrenched and profoundly repressive military dictatorship that had deprived them of “bread, freedom and social justice” for as long as most people could remember. The main slogan in the first wave of protests unsurprisingly became: الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام‎ — the people demand the fall of the regime. Note the important point that the Arabic word for “regime” (nizam) is perhaps better translated as system, which indicates that this is not just about a specific group of privileged people but about a whole set of oppressive social structures. The people demand the downfall of this system.

In this sense, the system’s initial reaction was every bit as brutal as it was predictable: it simply tried to quash the revolt. But when it became self-evident that this approach wasn’t quite working, the true ruling class shifted strategies. The army’s top-brass recognized that to perpetuate its rule, or at least secure its economic interests and privileged political position, it would have to appease the masses. And so the military command, led by Field Marshal Mohamed Tantawi — Mubarak’s long-time Defense Minister and personal confidant, known in ruling circles as “Mubarak’s poodle” — simply turned on their former master and pushed him from power.

This led to the 15-month rule of the SCAF, which was supposed to be a transition period giving way to Egypt’s first democratic elections, but which was marked by continued mass mobilizations to save the revolution from the army’s incessant attempts to stall the revolutionary process and repress the ongoing protests. Belying its own pro-democratic rhetoric, the SCAF brutally cracked down on the protesters, killing hundreds and imprisoning, torturing and maiming thousands. During the second wave of revolt, as hundreds of thousands again amassed in Tahrir Square, the main slogan of the revolutionaries simply became: “down with military rule.”

By early 2012, the SCAF realized that its direct rule over society was badly affecting its carefully crafted mythology as a patriotic institution aligned with the goals of the revolution, potentially endangering its economic interests. At that point, it was happy to just leave politics behind and let some eager civilians take the blame. It was clear, however, that the only social force organized enough to take on such a responsibility was the Muslim Brotherhood. And so the army called elections, knowing full well that the Islamists would win, but recognizing just as well that it was in its own best interests to retreat to the wings and let elected politicians solve their mess. In fact, the army ascertained that the Brotherhood would win the elections, allowing its members to man the polling stations, count the ballots and beat up “troublemakers”.

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The other possibility is that the young revolutionaries behind January 25 and now June 30 decide that with tens of millions of people behind them (a very different situation than existed after the January 25 revolution, in which far fewer people actively took part), they can afford to go for the proverbial knock-out blow. Indeed, with the economy in tatters and the country on the precipice of unprecedented civil strife, the military is potentially in a far weaker position now than it was after Mubarak’s departure.

Αναδημοσίευουμε τμήματα από άρθρο που εμφανίστηκε στο Al Jazeera σχετικά με τη συγκυρία στην Αίγυπτο. Ο συγγραφέας ανήκει προφανώς στο “δημοκρατικό” στρατόπεδο, και όπως κάθε ένας που ανήκει σ’αυτό έχει ως ορίζοντα του, αναγκαστικά την κατάληψη του κράτους (ανεξάρτητα αν το λέει ή όχι, και αυτός το λέει).  Θέτει όμως ορισμένα από τα βασικά ζητήματα της συγκυρίας με ενδιαφέροντα τρόπο (η έμφαση σε ορισμένα σημεία δική μας):

After 887 days of protests, tear gas, tanks, camels, horses, tent cities, marches, birdshot, live ammunition, ultras, great music, torture, rape, disappointments, spears, knives, Facebook campaigns, undercover thugs, military detentions, men with scimitars, show trials, elections, referendums, annulments, arson, police brutality, negotiations, machinations, committees, strikes, street battles, foreign bailouts, extreme theatre, revolutionary graffiti, television drama, Leninist study circles, and Salafi sit-ins, Egypt’s young revolutionaries have managed to do the near impossible: force the “nizzam” – the system – to restart a deeply flawed transition process in a manner which, at least at the surface, puts civilians in charge of a fraught transition process that was likely doomed the first time around the moment SCAF took control.

[…]

The last two and a half years have largely flowed more or less as one might have imagined once SCAF assumed control of the transition. The military’s broad control of Egyptian politics for half a century, it’s huge role in the economy – including in the transition to a neoliberal order that was supposed to weaken the grip of the old elites but broadly strengthened it, its highly authoritarian and patriarchal nature, and its guaranteed support from its major Western and Arab sponsors, all left it with little incentive or even ability to move the country along a path that would actually produce freedom, dignity, social justice, and an overall better life for most Egyptians.

The problem was, and remains, that the only way for the revolution to achieve its core goals would be literally to create a new state – a new set of power relations and institutions through which they flow that would profoundly redistribute social, economic and political power throughout Egyptian society. But to do this they would have to take on, and defeat, the military and the order it represented. As long as the military controls the political and economic process in Egypt, the vast majority of Egyptians will live well below their economic and political potential.

The honeymoon between the military and the revolutionaries was over not long after it began, as the military launched waves of assaults on and even massacres of demonstrators and activists, detaining thousands, most without civilian trials, even as the deep state began to shore up its political footing through the emerging constitutional, legislative and electoral process. In the summer and fall of 2011, spring and fall of 2012, revolutionary forces returned to the streets and battled the military, and ultimately the Brotherhood-regime, not with any hope of finishing the revolution, but to ensure it wasn’t completely lost.

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[youtube]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_YqCsit-2js[/youtube]

Τελικά το όριο του “δημοκρατικού” κινήματος της Αιγύπτου εκφράστηκε όσο πιο ξεκάθαρα γίνεται με μια νέα στρατιωτική δικτατορία: “Γιατί το πρόβλημα βέβαια δεν είναι ο Μόρσι, ο κάθε Μόρσι μπορεί ανά πάσα στιγμή να θυσιαστεί για να συνεχίσει “να δουλεύει το μαγαζί”. Όσο αυτόνομο και να είναι το πολιτικό προσωπικό η αυτονομία αυτή είναι πάντα σχετική, το κράτος αποτελεί τη συλλογική έκφραση μιας τάξης που εκμεταλλεύεται την άλλη. Η συλλογική αυτή έκφραση δεν είναι ποτέ αποτέλεσμα μιας ήπιας διαδικασίας, καθώς στον πυρήνα της βρίσκεται ο λυσσαλέος ανταγωνισμός, ο οποίος στην επιφάνεια φαίνεται πολιτικός, από λίγο πιο μέσα μπορεί να φαίνεται περισσότερο οικονομικός. Αυτός ο ανταγωνισμός όμως είναι ο τρόπος οργάνωσης της συνεργασίας τους, της συνεργασίας στην οποία ο βουτηγμένος στο αίμα νικητής θα εγκαθιδρύσει μια σταθερότητα που θα βολεύει και τους “ηττημένους”, καθώς και οι δύο κοιτούν με τρόμο προς την πλευρά του πραγματικού τους αντιπάλου: του προλεταριάτου, δηλαδή του τμήματος εκείνου της εργατικής τάξης που η δραστηριότητα του μέσα στην ταξική πάλη αμφισβητεί την ίδια τη σχέση του κεφαλαίου.” (#Tamarod: Η Αίγυπτος ως έκφραση του ορίου του παγκόσμιου “δημοκρατικού” κινήματος)

Η δικτατορία γεννιέται μέσα από τη δημοκρατία, ως μια αναγκαία για το κεφάλαιο πολιτική μορφή. Αναγκαία για τη συνέχιση της συσσώρευσης και της αναπαραγωγής της κοινωνίας του κεφαλαίου γενικότερα. Τα γεγονότα εντάσσονται στη δυναμική της εποχής των ταραχών και την επικαιροποιούν εντείνοντας τις εσωτερικές της αντιφάσεις:

[…] Η Αίγυπτος και η Τυνησία έδειξαν ότι πράγματι η πτώση της κυβέρνησης ολοκληρώνει αυτά τα κινήματα. Στην πραγματικότητα βέβαια, ότι αρχικά φάνταζε ως νίκη γρήγορα αποδείχτηκε ότι είναι ήττα, καθώς νέα αστυνομικά κράτη εγκαθιδρύθηκαν και η αναδιάρθρωση προχωράει κανονικά με περικοπές επιδομάτων, αυξήσεις στις τιμές των τροφίμων κτλ. Το κίνημα όμως στην Αίγυπτο και την Τυνησία δεν μπόρεσε να ξανασταθεί στα πόδια του, καθώς ο αρχικός στόχος που αντιστοιχούσε στην ενότητα του επετεύχθη […] Μπορούν τα μεσαία στρώματα να ενσωματωθούν στο προλεταριάτο, ως δραστηριότητα αμφισβήτησης του κεφαλαίου, αν δεν ολοκληρωθούν πρώτα αυτά τα κινήματα με την πολιτική νίκη (δηλαδή ουσιαστική ήττα) τους; Η ήττα τους, που περνάει μέσα από την πολιτική τους νίκη, φέρνει αναγκαστικά τις διαιρέσεις που υπάρχουν στην επιφάνεια. Ένα κομμάτι του κινήματος προσπαθεί να συνεχίσει την εξέγερση, η οποία όμως παύει να έχει λαϊκή υποστήριξη (δηλαδή διαταξική υποστήριξη, καθώς η τάξη είναι σχέση και όχι κατηγορία). Χωρίς τη μαζική συμμετοχή των αποκλεισμένων και των φτωχών, πώς μπορεί να συνεχιστεί αυτή η εξεγερτική πορεία; Μπορεί; (από το κείμενο: Η άνιση δυναμική της εποχής των ταραχών).

Δες επίσης το ντοκυμανταίρ Αιγυπτιακός Χειμώνας που γυρίστηκε το Φλεβάρη.

Η πραγματικότητα της στρατιωτικής δικτατορίας που εγκαθιδρύθηκε για έναμιση χρόνο πριν τον Μόρσι:

[youtube]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mnFVYewkWEY&bpctr=1372931751[/youtube]

[youtube]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1E5nqGaPdgY[/youtube]

Αναδημοσίευση από  linksunten.indymedia.org (η έμφαση με πλάγια σε ορισμένα σημεία δική μας)

I met Mohammed Hassan Aazab earlier this year over tea at a table of young anarchists in downtown Cairo. The anniversary of the revolution had just passed with massive protests and the emergence of a Western-style black bloc that appeared to have little to do with anarchists in the city. At the time, much of the ongoing grassroots organizing was against sexual violence — in particular, the mob sexual assaults that have become synonymous with any large gathering in Tahrir. The trauma of such violence carried out against protesters was apparent in our conversation. In fact, Aazab told me that he was done with protests and politics, and had resigned himself to the dysfunction of day-to-day life in Egypt.
Then came June 30. Crowds reportedly as large as 33 million took to the streets to call for the Muslim Brotherhood to step down from power, just a year after Mohammed Morsi took office. In the pre-dawn moments of July 1, as Aazab’s phone battery dwindled steadily, I reconnected with him to chat a bit about his return to resistance.

The interview:

What’s the feeling in Cairo right now? We’re seeing reports here of the largest protests in human history.

Today, all of us worked really hard to get through the protests without violence. Everyone’s afraid a civil war could break out. The protesters gave Morsi 48 hours to step down. If that deadline passes, there’ll be a general strike. In the last five hours, 10 people were killed — four in Assiut and six in front of the Muslim Brotherhood headquarters. The sun is coming up now. All the old revolutionaries are preparing for clashes in the streets.

I heard that the Muslim Brotherhood headquarters were torched. Is that true?

Yes. And it’s still surrounded by protesters right now.

Who called for the general strike? Are there particular unions involved?

No. The unions are totally ineffective. 

So how is the strike organized?

Tamarod [the Rebel Movement] called for the general strike. Actually, it has not been organized in advance; it has been a spontaneous development. It will work by people believing in and supporting it.

Do you think people will follow through?

Port Said will start the general strike tomorrow. I have no idea to what extent people will follow through on it, beyond that. But it’s clear people are absolutely determined to force Morsi out.

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αναδημοσίευση από Jadaliyya

The issue of women’s empowerment continues to be of paramount significance in determining the future of the incomplete Arab revolutions. Numerous scholars, activists, and feminists have commented with concern about the precarious position of women after the contagious revolutions, which started in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Many haveexpressed anxiety that the controversial gender issue in the Middle East will dominate the coming years, as even Christian leaders transmit Islamists’ pressure on women to dress “more modestly” to their communities. Others have remarked that misogynist attitudes are observable today across the post-revolutionary Arab states, because the Islamists in power have revealed themselves to be agents of an “Islamic neoliberal” ideology that works hand in hand with constraining measures regarding women. These observers have pointed to various shocking acts that all converge in one direction: the targeting of women’s bodies.

The aged President Hosni Mubarak had long embodied the oppressive and institutionalized patriarchy in Egypt. After Mubarak’s ouster in February 2011, an ageing military junta replaced him, and continued to use violence to subdue protest. It was as if a targeted vengeance were being directed against Egypt’s youth, and as if the generational conflict between the old generals and the young protesters had to be played out through the mutilation of young bodies.

Today, almost a year since the election of longtime Muslim Brotherhood figure President Mohamed Morsi, there is a general feeling that nothing has really changed in terms of citizens’ rights. None of the security officials responsible for the series of killings of protesters since January 2011 have been convicted. As this in turn sparks new demonstrations, the Brotherhood regime continues the use of thuggery and public violence,together with sexual harassment, to terrorize citizens and deter them from protest in Tahrir Square.

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Αναδημοσιεύουμε τμήμα μιας συνέντευξης ενός στελέχους της Morgan Stanley Investment Management, γιατί συνδέει τη σημερινή οικονομική κατάσταση των BRICs  και γενικότερα των “αναδυόμενων οικονομιών” με τις ταραχές, με τη γλώσσα του κεφαλαίου φυσικά, αλλά η γλώσσα αυτή σ’αυτήν την περίπτωση είναι ιδιαίτερα χρήσιμη. (Η έμφαση με πλάγια σε ορισμένα σημεία δική μας)

Ezra Klein: So as I understand it, your view is that people shouldn’t be surprised to see protests in Brazil and riots in Turkey. It’s the long period of economic growth and political calm that preceded them that you consider surprising, or at least unusual. Is that right? 

Ruchir Sharma: Absolutely. The last decade gave us this misleading impression because growth was booming in every single emerging market and that was keeping everything calm. It gave the impression that this was a new era for the emerging world.

But a lot of that growth was driven by low interest rates and the commodities boom. The long-term growth rate of emerging markets is about 4 to 5 percent annually, but from 2003 to 2008 it was over 7 percent. At the same time, inflation, which used to be a big problem, collapsed.  But now all that’s reversing. In Brazil, for instance, growth is down and inflation is creeping back up. And that’s how you get a situation where a rise in bus prices can be the final straw that gets people into the streets.

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Ενδιαφέρον κείμενο για την κατανόηση των περίπλοκων συγκρούσεων που λαμβάνουν χώρα στην Αίγυπτο. Από το roarmag

Egypt’s revolution will never be complete until the authoritarian neoliberal state is finally dismantled. Only the power of the streets can do this.

Morsi is trembling. Two days after millions of Egyptians took to the streets to once again demand the downfall of the regime, the Muslim Brotherhood looks weaker and more isolated than ever. On Monday, the grassroots Tamarod campaign that kicked off the mass protests gave Morsi 24 hours to step down and threatened an indefinite wave of civil disobedience if he failed to comply. The army quickly joined in, giving the government a thinly-veiled 48-hour ultimatum to “meet the people’s demands”.

Since then, at least six government ministers have jumped ship, with rumors doing the rounds earlier on Tuesday that the entire cabinet had resigned. To further compound the pressure on Morsi, the army command released spectacular footage showing Sunday’s mass mobilizations from the bird’s eye view of the military helicopters that circled over Cairo carrying Egyptian and army flags — set to bombastic music, patriotic slogans and incessant chants of “Out! Out! Out!” directed at the President and Muslim Brotherhood.

On Tuesday morning, government officials, opposition leaders and the military command were all quick to deny that the army’s statements and actions were indications of an impending military coup — even though one of Morsi’s advisors had earlier gone off script and argued that the office of the Presidency did regard the army’s ultimatum as such. Still, Tamarod organizers and opposition leaders have unambiguously welcomed the army’s stance in the hope that its secular command will take their side and “gently” nudge the Islamists from power.

Many of those in the streets also seem to be broadly supportive of an army intervention. Every time one of the military helicopters flew over Tahrir, the people would greet it with loud cheers, chanting that “the people and the military are one hand”. Still, the hardcore activists who have struggled ceaselessly to defend their revolution over the past two-and-a-half years remember the lies and brutalities of the military junta that they themselves helped to push from power, and continue to call for total liberation: “No Mubarak, No Military, No Morsi!”

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Ανήκουν σε διαφορετικά στρατόπεδα οι αδελφοί μουσουλμάνοι και ο στρατός, ή έχουν δίκιο οι διαδηλωτές εκείνοι που φωνάζουν: “ΟΥΤΕ ΣΤΡΑΤΟΣ, ΟΥΤΕ ΑΔΕΛΦΟΙ;”

Αναδημοσιεύουμε το ενδιαφέρον άρθρο για την ανταγωνιστική αλλά και ερωτική τους σχέση από το  jadaliyya

The politics of the past two years have generated widespread interest in the historical relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and Egypt’s wielders of power, especially at a time when observers are eager to understand the prospects for accommodation (or adversity) between the MB and traditional bureaucratic powers inside the Egyptian state, such as the military establishment.

For instance, the circumstances surrounding the election of President Mohamed Morsi in June 2012 have raised numerous questions about the MB’s relationship with Egypt’s military rulers. During the lead-up to the announcement of the election results, it seemed that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) was bargaining with the Brotherhoodover the future of the country. While official results were due on 20 June, their announcement was postponed to 24 June with little transparency on why the official vote count was being withheld and what was happening behind the scenes.

MB statements at the time suggested that the SCAF was holding the results hostage until the group accepts the continuation of military leaders’ reserved powers as per the constitutional annex that SCAF had issued on 17 June 2012 shortly before the end of voting. Before it was annulled last August by President Morsi, the annex to the Constitutional Declaration set limitations on presidential authority and granted the SCAF legislative powers in light of the dissolution of parliament in mid-June. In its official response that same month, the MB vowed to fight for presidential powers and called on its supporters to occupy Tahrir Square in protest of SCAF’s constitutional annex. Eventually, official results were released declaring Morsi’s victory. The MB’s nominee ended up swearing the oath to the Supreme Constitutional Court, thus implicitly recognizing the dissolution of parliament and the SCAF-sponsored constitutional framework that the Brotherhood supposedly rejected. Morsi became Egypt’s first elected president after the January 25 Revolution, yet one question remains lurking in the background: at what price?

The lead-up to Morsi’s election is by no means the first time observers have been left to speculate about underhanded deals between the Brotherhood and Egyptian authorities. Since the days of the monarchy, the relationship between the MB and Egypt’s power wielders has been subject to debate and controversy. While the MB has conventionally been known as a strong oppositionist voice that has been subjected to the wrath of successive Egyptian rulers in the form of marginalization and repression, others argue that the story is much more complicated.

Since the toppling of Mubarak, many have speculated about whether covert pacts and understandings between the Muslim Brotherhood and the SCAF have been in place, and if so, what did they entail? Complicating any investigations of such allegations is a political environment in which the Brotherhood and its adversaries have constantly been exchanging politically motivated accusations of collaboration with the country’s military leaders. The historical context and the events of the past year, however, are quite revealing.

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