[youtube]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gQNhaUXSQec[/youtube]

Αναδημοσίευση από Madamasr (από τον τρόπο παρουσίασης των γεγονότων φαίνεται ότι το αντι-ισλαμικό στρατόπεδο δεν μπορεί να χωνέψει ότι ο στρατός δολοφονεί συστηματικά ισλαμιστές διαδηλωτές).

[youtube]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mgf9InApSsw[/youtube]

Τι αποτελέσματα θα έχει τις επόμενες μέρες; Ο Ραχόι απονομιμοποιείται και τα γεγονότα Τουρκίας & Βραζιλίας δεν είναι καλός οιωνός για το ισπανικό κράτος

Από τον τύπο τους:

Χάος στη Μαδρίτη αλλά και στη Βαλένθια κατά τη διάρκεια της νύκτας, όταν οι αστυνομικές δυνάμεις επενέβησαν δυναμικά για να καταστείλουν αντικυβερνητικές διαδηλώσεις.

Συνολικά τραυματίστηκαν 16 άτομα στη διάρκεια των συγκρούσεων ενώ η αστυνομία προχώρησε σε 6 συλλήψεις.

Η οργή του κόσμου στην Ισπανία για το σκάνδαλο με τα μαύρα ταμεία διογκώνεται.
Τα γραφεία του Λαϊκού Κόμματος βρίσκονται υπό στενή πολιορκία με δυνάμεις επιβολής της τάξης να τα περιφρουρούν ενώ οι διαδηλωτές ζητούν την παραίτηση του πρωθυπουργού Μαριάνο Ραχόι.

Αναδημοσίευση από tahriricn (η έμφαση σε ορισμένα σημεία δική μας)

From: هيئات العمل الثوري/حركة عصيان/disobey movement

To all Revolutionary Groups in Tunisia,

“No president for me”

Now two years have passed since the outbreak of the uprisings yet, despite the succession of governments and in spite of the abundance of promises and electoral programs, the economic and social crisis is aggravating and the conditions of the greater majority of the people, that is, the wage-earners, the unemployed, the poor and the marginalized, are deteriorating. The political parties’ tussle over power is driving the country towards civil war. Political institutions, especially the Constituent Assembly as well as the government, the prefectures and sub-prefectures, etc claim in bankruptcy as they proved to be incapable of finding solutions. These institutions are actually part of the problem for the new rulers scramble over privileges and rush to the seizure of bailiwicks. The system of favoritism and loyalism is back. Moreover, both police and the military fail to provide real security executing the same brutal repression tactics at protests. On the other hand, while the owners of fortunes, businessmen and intermediates of every sort are getting richer, the State keeps on boosting prices and insinuates the axing of all basic consumerist items subsidies as dictated by the IMF. The State is also axing unemployment insurance, cutting jobs and calling off all the social gains the masses earned during the early part of the revolutionary movement so that the masses pays the price of the crisis under the mottos of “Commonweal,” “Saving the National Economy,” that is, saving capital from its generalized crisis.

The catastrophic outcome of the revolutionary course so far, has proved the fact that the handing over of what matters us to a bunch of political back scratchers taking advantage of the revolution, either under the motto of “Consensus,” promoted by the Higher Authority For the Fulfillment of the Revolution Objectives, or in the name, or in the name of “Electoral Legitimacy” springing out of the Constituent Assembly, cannot but lead to the reemergence of the same authoritarian regime, with the same economic and social plans, only with different new faces and a new liberal democratic setting which steals the masses’ right to manage its own business submitting it to a handful of bureaucrats and bottom feeders whose only interest is scrambling and fighting for power and sovereignty.

If the revolted masses fail to assure the autogestion of all aspects related to economic, social and administrative life through local self-management councils in districts, towns, counties and villages, and fail to manage all social life aspects through a central Popular Assembly composed of local councils’ members who are elected, assigned and, ousted by communities; if they fail to transform means of labor into social property which are run in a cooperative way according to plans that could be designed by experts under popular supervision so as to guarantee the social production that satisfies real social solidary needs for every member of society and cuts with the capitalist way which puts social energies at stake for the sake of profit and competition; also, if the beaten masses do not initiate a reordering process of police, the military, the judiciary and the public administration on the basis of elections so as to end up with hierarchy and privileges and to impose a popular supervision on these institutions so as they work in the service of the people and cease to be alien organisms imposed in a bureaucratic and authoritarian way; if the masses do not initiate rearranging of big land ownerships into cooperative ownerships supervised by elected councils that work together to liberate the agricultural production from the monopoly of large landowners and orient it to the satisfaction of the people’s real needs so as to cut with all forms of intermediacy, if the people fail to claim its right to choose the convenient production mode of its material and spiritual life in a free and solidarity way through elected local and regional councils, if the masses fail to realize such revolutionary initiatives without the intervention of the least political party, then the political, economic and social system will prevail and produce the same favorable conditions for the crisis which, at the end of the day, in the absence of revolutionary solutions created by the masses, not imposed by political parties’ pre-designed programs, will lead us to the total chaos many people witnessed and anyways will not lead us to the realization of the uprising masses objectives.

Indeed, nothing is going to change if the movement remains limited to protests and demands. Regardless of which political party is in power, the prevailing system has proved its incapacity to satisfy such demands. Hence, the revolutionary movement is today in front of two alternatives: either stepping inside a new phase where masses take the initiative of reorganizing the social, economic and administrative life and impose it as fact, or exhausting its energies on limited sectoral and regional demands which will provide the fighting political elites within the system with enough time to reorganize under the mottos of “Consensus” and “Commonweal,” and to proceed by then to the preparation of a counter-attack that is capable of drowning the country in bloody repression paving the way to one or another political party to invest popular militance to better situate itself within the battlefield of partisan conflict over power.

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The other possibility is that the young revolutionaries behind January 25 and now June 30 decide that with tens of millions of people behind them (a very different situation than existed after the January 25 revolution, in which far fewer people actively took part), they can afford to go for the proverbial knock-out blow. Indeed, with the economy in tatters and the country on the precipice of unprecedented civil strife, the military is potentially in a far weaker position now than it was after Mubarak’s departure.

Αναδημοσίευουμε τμήματα από άρθρο που εμφανίστηκε στο Al Jazeera σχετικά με τη συγκυρία στην Αίγυπτο. Ο συγγραφέας ανήκει προφανώς στο “δημοκρατικό” στρατόπεδο, και όπως κάθε ένας που ανήκει σ’αυτό έχει ως ορίζοντα του, αναγκαστικά την κατάληψη του κράτους (ανεξάρτητα αν το λέει ή όχι, και αυτός το λέει).  Θέτει όμως ορισμένα από τα βασικά ζητήματα της συγκυρίας με ενδιαφέροντα τρόπο (η έμφαση σε ορισμένα σημεία δική μας):

After 887 days of protests, tear gas, tanks, camels, horses, tent cities, marches, birdshot, live ammunition, ultras, great music, torture, rape, disappointments, spears, knives, Facebook campaigns, undercover thugs, military detentions, men with scimitars, show trials, elections, referendums, annulments, arson, police brutality, negotiations, machinations, committees, strikes, street battles, foreign bailouts, extreme theatre, revolutionary graffiti, television drama, Leninist study circles, and Salafi sit-ins, Egypt’s young revolutionaries have managed to do the near impossible: force the “nizzam” – the system – to restart a deeply flawed transition process in a manner which, at least at the surface, puts civilians in charge of a fraught transition process that was likely doomed the first time around the moment SCAF took control.

[…]

The last two and a half years have largely flowed more or less as one might have imagined once SCAF assumed control of the transition. The military’s broad control of Egyptian politics for half a century, it’s huge role in the economy – including in the transition to a neoliberal order that was supposed to weaken the grip of the old elites but broadly strengthened it, its highly authoritarian and patriarchal nature, and its guaranteed support from its major Western and Arab sponsors, all left it with little incentive or even ability to move the country along a path that would actually produce freedom, dignity, social justice, and an overall better life for most Egyptians.

The problem was, and remains, that the only way for the revolution to achieve its core goals would be literally to create a new state – a new set of power relations and institutions through which they flow that would profoundly redistribute social, economic and political power throughout Egyptian society. But to do this they would have to take on, and defeat, the military and the order it represented. As long as the military controls the political and economic process in Egypt, the vast majority of Egyptians will live well below their economic and political potential.

The honeymoon between the military and the revolutionaries was over not long after it began, as the military launched waves of assaults on and even massacres of demonstrators and activists, detaining thousands, most without civilian trials, even as the deep state began to shore up its political footing through the emerging constitutional, legislative and electoral process. In the summer and fall of 2011, spring and fall of 2012, revolutionary forces returned to the streets and battled the military, and ultimately the Brotherhood-regime, not with any hope of finishing the revolution, but to ensure it wasn’t completely lost.

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Η JP Morgan σε πρόσφατη μελέτη της (τέλος Μαίου 2013) που μπορεί να βρεθεί εδώ, παρουσιάζει την αναδιάρθρωση που λαμβάνει χώρα στην ευρωζώνη ως ένα ταξίδι το οποίο βρίσκεται στη μέση και έχει … πολύ δρόμο ακόμη. Εξηγεί πως “πρέπει” να προχωρήσει η αναδιάρθρωση και ποια είναι τα προβλήματα που αντιμετωπίζει ως τώρα.

Παραθέτουμε δύο αποσπάσματα. Το πρώτο είναι η κριτική της JPM στα πολιτικά συστήματα της “περιφέρειας της ευρωζώνης”, τα οποία είναι πολύ πιο δημοκρατικά από όσο πρέπει για να προχωρήσει η αναδιάρθρωση. Το δεύτερο είναι οι εκτιμήσεις τους για τα δύο πιθανά σενάρια συνέχισης της αναδιάρθρωσης. Ιδού:

The journey of national political reform

At the start of the crisis, it was generally assumed that the national legacy problems were economic in nature. But, as the crisis has evolved, it has become apparent that there are deep seated political problems in the periphery, which, in our view, need to change if EMU is going to function properly in the long run. The political systems in the periphery were established in the aftermath of dictatorship, and were defined by that experience. Constitutions tend to show a strong socialist influence, reflecting the political strength that left wing parties gained after the defeat of fascism. Political systems around the periphery typically display several of the following features: weak executives; weak central states relative to regions; constitutional protection of labor rights; consensus building systems which foster political clientalism; and the right to protest if unwelcome changes are made to the political status quo. The shortcomings of this political legacy have been revealed by the crisis. Countries around the periphery have only been partially successful in producing fiscal and economic reform agendas, with governments constrained by constitutions (Portugal), powerful regions (Spain), and the rise of populist parties (Italy and Greece). There is a growing recognition of the extent of this problem, both in the core and in the periphery. Change is beginning to take place. Spain took steps to address some of the contradictions of the post-Franco settlement with last year’s legislation enabling closer fiscal oversight of the regions. But, outside Spain little has happened thus far. The key test in the coming year will be in Italy, where the new government clearly has an opportunity to engage in meaningful political reform. But, in terms of the idea of a journey, the process of political reform has barely begun.

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