[youtube]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GTSSW_PidCo[/youtube]

via @riotersunited

Αναδημοσίευση από jadaliyya

Last September, sixteen-year-old Eman Mustafa was walking with a friend in the village of Arab Al Kablatin Assiut, when a man groped her breasts. She turned to face him and spat in his face. He shot her dead with an automatic rifle as a price for her bravery. Mustafa’s death was an eye-opener call to those who claim that sexual violence is an urban issue. Thanks to human rights organizations and activist groups, Eman’s killer was sentenced to life imprisonment in June 2013.

Violence against women across historical, cultural, and national divides continues to be a socially accepted practice, if not a norm. In the realms of both policy and social awareness, we have collectively failed to tackle this issue with serious rigor. As a result, we seem to be witnessing an increase in sexual violence and brutality.

In Egypt, sexual harassment is widespread and touches the lives of the majority of women whether on the streets, in public transportation, or at the work place, the super market, or political protests. It is true that sexual harassment still lacks a unified definition, but it is not difficult to identify unwelcome verbal or physical sexual violation. Many Egyptians, women included, are unclear as to what constitutes sexual harassment. Others sadly, do not think it is a problem. One thing is clear though, and that is the actions of the various governments of the last thirty years have been limited to statements of regret and unmet promises.

The word taharrush (harassment) is a relatively new term in the daily lexicon. Until recently, sexual harassment was referred to as mu‘aksa (flirtation). That term alone reveals the multiple layers of denial, misogyny, and violence Egyptians must confront in tackling sexual harassment. In addition to rape and physical assault we must equally tackle name-calling, groping, and the barraging of women with sexual invitations. All of these acts normalize violence and hatred against women and they must become socially unacceptable.

Even though, for example, Eman Mustafa was a veiled villager, one key argument in the victim-blaming that is salient in our everyday narratives is the common and vulgar perception that sexual harassment occurs when women dress “provocatively.”  In fact, the only thing that Egyptians who face sexual harassment have in common is that over ninety-nine percent of them are females.

Over the last decade, Egyptians have been working intensively on spreading both social and legal awareness on sexual violence and harassment. In 2005, the Egyptian Center for Women’s rights launched its “Safe Streets for Everyone” initiative to combat sexual harassment. In 2008, more than sixteen human rights organizations and independent groups formed the “Task Force Against Sexual Violence.” In 2010, that Task Force released its own bill to amend Penal Code provisions on sexual violence. That year too, the volunteer-based initiative Harassmap established a free software method to receive anonymous SMS reporting that it would process into a mapping system. Harassmap’s mission was to render sexual harassment socially unacceptable.

Over the past two years, activists have formed many other independent movements and online groups that raise awareness, empower women to stand up against gender-based violence and speak out by sharing testimonies and ideas to combat sexual harassment, and in some cases, expose the perpetrators. After Eman Mustafa’s death last September, anti-sexual harassment protests were held at Assiut University to condemn the murder of a girl who fought for her bodily rights.

Women who have suffered from sexual harassment are usually reluctant to tell their stories, fearing reprisals and the dreaded label of the agitators. Nevertheless, if there is any noticeable progress in fighting sexual harassment in Egypt, it would be the rise in the number of women who are speaking up about their experiences and filing reports against their offenders. Another important development has been the formation of independent volunteer-based groups who fight sexual violence on the ground across the nation. In 2010, Harassmap received requests to expand their campaign to Alexandria, Daqahliya, and Minya. This year, Harassmap has expanded to sixteen governorates other than Cairo. With the help of more than 700 volunteers nationwide, Harassmap is reaching out to rural communities to end social acceptability of sexual harassment.

In June 2008, Noha al-Ostaz experienced a form of sexual violence on a Cairo street. She was confident that ignoring the behavior of the offender was ineffective. With the help of a friend and a bystander, Al-Ostaz managed to take the offender to a police station and file charges against him. Three months later, and for the first time in Egypt, the offender was sentenced to three years in prison on charges of sexual assault. Al-Ostaz paved the way for other women to stand up for their rights. Her action has encouraged several to pursue harassment charges against assailants.

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[vimeo]http://vimeo.com/54299520#[/vimeo]

Το επιτόκιο δανεισμού του πορτογαλικού κράτους εκτοξεύεται, η κυβέρνηση “εθνικής ενότητας” παραπαίει (αλλά πρέπει να σωθεί). Η Πορτογαλία ετοιμάζεται για ένα σκληρό “μνημόνιο”. Αυτό το video δείχνει την ατμόσφαιρα που υπήρχε στην απεργία που έγινε στις 14 Νοέμβρη 2012, μια “πανευρωπαική” απεργία που εκεί όμως την είχαν πάρει περισσότερο στα σοβαρά από ότι εδώ (στην Ελλάδα είχε ψηφιστεί το 3ο μνημόνιο στις 7 Νοέμβρη 2012).

Αναδημοσίευση από skya πολύ ενδιαφέρουσας συνέντευξης (που δόθηκε το 2011) του Jano Charbel

αναδημοσίευση από Jadaliyya

The issue of women’s empowerment continues to be of paramount significance in determining the future of the incomplete Arab revolutions. Numerous scholars, activists, and feminists have commented with concern about the precarious position of women after the contagious revolutions, which started in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Many haveexpressed anxiety that the controversial gender issue in the Middle East will dominate the coming years, as even Christian leaders transmit Islamists’ pressure on women to dress “more modestly” to their communities. Others have remarked that misogynist attitudes are observable today across the post-revolutionary Arab states, because the Islamists in power have revealed themselves to be agents of an “Islamic neoliberal” ideology that works hand in hand with constraining measures regarding women. These observers have pointed to various shocking acts that all converge in one direction: the targeting of women’s bodies.

The aged President Hosni Mubarak had long embodied the oppressive and institutionalized patriarchy in Egypt. After Mubarak’s ouster in February 2011, an ageing military junta replaced him, and continued to use violence to subdue protest. It was as if a targeted vengeance were being directed against Egypt’s youth, and as if the generational conflict between the old generals and the young protesters had to be played out through the mutilation of young bodies.

Today, almost a year since the election of longtime Muslim Brotherhood figure President Mohamed Morsi, there is a general feeling that nothing has really changed in terms of citizens’ rights. None of the security officials responsible for the series of killings of protesters since January 2011 have been convicted. As this in turn sparks new demonstrations, the Brotherhood regime continues the use of thuggery and public violence,together with sexual harassment, to terrorize citizens and deter them from protest in Tahrir Square.

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Ανήκουν σε διαφορετικά στρατόπεδα οι αδελφοί μουσουλμάνοι και ο στρατός, ή έχουν δίκιο οι διαδηλωτές εκείνοι που φωνάζουν: “ΟΥΤΕ ΣΤΡΑΤΟΣ, ΟΥΤΕ ΑΔΕΛΦΟΙ;”

Αναδημοσιεύουμε το ενδιαφέρον άρθρο για την ανταγωνιστική αλλά και ερωτική τους σχέση από το  jadaliyya

The politics of the past two years have generated widespread interest in the historical relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and Egypt’s wielders of power, especially at a time when observers are eager to understand the prospects for accommodation (or adversity) between the MB and traditional bureaucratic powers inside the Egyptian state, such as the military establishment.

For instance, the circumstances surrounding the election of President Mohamed Morsi in June 2012 have raised numerous questions about the MB’s relationship with Egypt’s military rulers. During the lead-up to the announcement of the election results, it seemed that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) was bargaining with the Brotherhoodover the future of the country. While official results were due on 20 June, their announcement was postponed to 24 June with little transparency on why the official vote count was being withheld and what was happening behind the scenes.

MB statements at the time suggested that the SCAF was holding the results hostage until the group accepts the continuation of military leaders’ reserved powers as per the constitutional annex that SCAF had issued on 17 June 2012 shortly before the end of voting. Before it was annulled last August by President Morsi, the annex to the Constitutional Declaration set limitations on presidential authority and granted the SCAF legislative powers in light of the dissolution of parliament in mid-June. In its official response that same month, the MB vowed to fight for presidential powers and called on its supporters to occupy Tahrir Square in protest of SCAF’s constitutional annex. Eventually, official results were released declaring Morsi’s victory. The MB’s nominee ended up swearing the oath to the Supreme Constitutional Court, thus implicitly recognizing the dissolution of parliament and the SCAF-sponsored constitutional framework that the Brotherhood supposedly rejected. Morsi became Egypt’s first elected president after the January 25 Revolution, yet one question remains lurking in the background: at what price?

The lead-up to Morsi’s election is by no means the first time observers have been left to speculate about underhanded deals between the Brotherhood and Egyptian authorities. Since the days of the monarchy, the relationship between the MB and Egypt’s power wielders has been subject to debate and controversy. While the MB has conventionally been known as a strong oppositionist voice that has been subjected to the wrath of successive Egyptian rulers in the form of marginalization and repression, others argue that the story is much more complicated.

Since the toppling of Mubarak, many have speculated about whether covert pacts and understandings between the Muslim Brotherhood and the SCAF have been in place, and if so, what did they entail? Complicating any investigations of such allegations is a political environment in which the Brotherhood and its adversaries have constantly been exchanging politically motivated accusations of collaboration with the country’s military leaders. The historical context and the events of the past year, however, are quite revealing.

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Σταχυολογούμε από εδώ. Έχει ενδιαφέρον γιατί αντιλαμβάνεται κανείς ποιοι κοινωνικοί ρόλοι αμφισβητήθηκαν και τι παρέμεινε “κανονικό”.

The park is divided into three.

Uptown is made up of the main platform facing Taksim square. It housed almost exclusively political stands and a Kurdish corner.

Midtown features a central rectangle, like a bath tub, flanked by an elevated East and West side. The Central Park was a mix of residential zones and socio-political stands. It’s characterised by the big square with the Fountain (10) and the children’s Castle (9).

The East Side is mainly residential. As a livestreaming collective, we had our base camp on the Upper East Side, at the intersection of Tenth Avenue and Second Street (14). For me personally, my secondary base was the International Corner, which I co-founded on Fourth Street (15). This area, the Lower East Side, was the core of the park, both logistically and politically. It housed the Commons, the Infirmary, the Kitchen, the Çapulçu Cafe and the Radio (1,2,3,4,12). It was also home to the Stage (11), which was controlled by Taksim Solidarity (17).

The West side was dominated by the fixed structured of what used to be a cafe, and what was turned into the Television studio of Çapulçu TV once it was occupied (13). Behind it, there was a natural border in the form a Grand Canyon leading down to the reconstruction site of Taksim square. Compared to the rest of the park, the far West Side was made up of slums.

At the border between the central square and downtown, a Memorial had been erected in honour of those who died (16). It consisted of the text ‘Taksim to the People’, dotted with candles that were lit every evening at nightfall.

Downtown differs from the rest of Gezi Park because of the organic layout of the streets as opposed to the rational Roman/American style city grid in Midtown. The heart of Downtown was entirely taken up by the central Warehouse (5), which collected and distributed all necessary medical, food and other supplies that were donated by the people of Istanbul and the rest of the world. Main features of Downtown, aside from the Victory garden, were the Library (7), built in the form of a fortress, and the Mosque (8), made from two party tents. At the exit of the park behind the Library there was also a subway station.

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Αναδημοσίευση από contrainfo

Μερικά λόγια για την κατάσταση στο Ρίο ντε Ζανέιρο από μία αναρχική προοπτική

Το ακόλουθο κείμενο αντανακλά το συλλογικό προβληματισμό διαφόρων ατόμων που συμμετέχουν στην αναρχική κατάληψη Φλορ ντου Ασφάλτου, η οποία βρίσκεται στο μάτι του κυκλώνα των σχεδίων αστικής ανάπλασης και της ακόλουθης σκλήρυνσης της καταστολής στο Ρίο ντε Ζανέιρο.

Έχει ως στόχο να συμβάλει, από μία αναρχική οπτική, στη διευκρίνιση των διαδικασιών ποινικοποίησης της φτώχειας και της κηρυγμένης κρατικής βίας απέναντι στα κινήματα αντίστασης που εξεγείρονται ενάντια σε αυτά τα σχέδια.

Αυτό που λειτούργησε ως κίνητρο για την ανάπτυξη του συγκεκριμένου έργου είναι η δύναμή του να προσθέσει περισσότερα στοιχεία στις συζητήσεις που έχουν ήδη ξεκινήσει στο Ρίο ντε Ζανέιρο και άλλες πόλεις, έτσι ώστε να δοθεί η ευκαιρία και σε άλλους ανθρώπους, που δεν έχουν ζήσει στο πετσί τους αυτή την πραγματικότητα, να ανασάνουν τελικά λίγο από τον αέρα αυτών των γεγονότων. Η συγκεκριμένη πρωτοβουλία προκύπτει επίσης από την πρόθεση της συνεισφοράς στον κοινωνικό πόλεμο, μιας και οι στρατηγικές της ιεραρχικής εξουσίας εδώ και αιώνες αναπαράγονται και επαναλαμβάνονται σε διαφορετικές περιοχές και χρονικές περιόδους.

Τελικά πιστεύουμε πως αυτό που ζούμε σήμερα εδώ μπορεί να μην είναι τίποτα παραπάνω από ένα προχωρημένο στάδιο της εγγενούς ασθένειας των μεγαλουπόλεων, τουλάχιστον όσον αφορά τα εδάφη που ελέγχονται από το βραζιλιάνικο κράτος.

Θέαμα και γενοκτονία

Το Ρίο ντε Ζανέιρο αποτελεί το μελλοντικό κέντρο διεξαγωγής του Μουντιάλ του 2014 και των Ολυμπιακών αγώνων του 2016 και μια εμβληματική μητρόπολη αναδυόμενη από ένα παραδείσιο και θαυμαστό οικοσύστημα (1). Είναι εδώ όπου σε κάθε σπιθαμή των δρόμων και των γειτονιών φανερώνονται οι εγγενείς αντιθέσεις του βασιλείου του εμπορίου: Απλωμένη σε διάφορες ζώνες της πόλης απαντάται η εκκωφαντική φτώχεια, η βαθιά παρακμή και η ωμή ανυπαρξία διαχείρισης ενώ στον αντίποδα, σε άλλες περιοχές, το λούσο της υγιεινής ντύνει το επιφανειακό σκηνικό προσομοίωσης μιας καταναλωτικής και άνετης ζωής, συνεχώς παρακολουθούμενης από κάμερες και φανερή αστυνόμευση. Αυτός ο τόπος τόσων ιστοριών και τόσων τραυμάτων, γνωστών ως κομμάτι της αποκαλούμενης «γενικής ιστορίας της Βραζιλίας», αποτελεί το πάλκο που εμφανίζεται ο ακραίος χαρακτήρας της πόλης και που μόνο εδώ μπορεί κανείς να τον ζήσει, τουλάχιστον σε αυτή την ένταση.

Σύμφωνα με το Δείκτη Ανθρώπινης Ανάπτυξης (ΔΑΑ) –συγκριτικό διεθνές μέτρο για την κατάταξη της οικονομικής «ανάπτυξης» σε κάθε τόπο– στην πόλη του Ρίο ντε Ζανέιρο συνυπάρχουν μερικές από τις πιο πλούσιες συνοικίες στον κόσμο, αντίστοιχες των πιο εύρωστων ευρωπαϊκών χωρών, ενώ την ίδια στιγμή πολλές φαβέλες παρουσιάζουν ένα δείκτη ισοδύναμο με αυτόν των πιο φτωχών χωρών της αφρικανικής ηπείρου. Οι ρίζες αυτής της κατάστασης μπορούν να εντοπιστούν στο ότι το Ρίο ήταν πάντα μια πόλη όπου συνυπήρχε ο ακραίος πλούτος και η ακραία φτώχεια, όντας ένα από τα μεγαλύτερα λιμάνια πώλησης απαχθέντων ανθρώπων από την Αφρική ως σκλάβων. Εκτός αυτού, υπήρξε για 12 χρόνια η πρωτεύουσα της πορτογαλικής αυτοκρατορίας και, μετά την «ανεξαρτησία» η πρωτεύουσα του βραζιλιάνικου κράτους ως τα μισά του 20ού αιώνα. Αν πριν οι αντιθέσεις εντοπίζονταν ανάμεσα στα παλάτια των ευγενών και στις σενζάλας (τρώγλες όπου έμεναν σε μεγάλες ομάδες οι μαύροι σκλάβοι τον καιρό της δουλείας) και στους λοιπούς θύλακες των μαύρων, σήμερα εκδηλώνονται ανάμεσα στις πάμπλουτες γειτονιές –ισάξιες του Μπέβερλυ Χιλς– και στις αμέτρητες φαβέλες.

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