Η JP Morgan σε πρόσφατη μελέτη της (τέλος Μαίου 2013) που μπορεί να βρεθεί εδώ, παρουσιάζει την αναδιάρθρωση που λαμβάνει χώρα στην ευρωζώνη ως ένα ταξίδι το οποίο βρίσκεται στη μέση και έχει … πολύ δρόμο ακόμη. Εξηγεί πως “πρέπει” να προχωρήσει η αναδιάρθρωση και ποια είναι τα προβλήματα που αντιμετωπίζει ως τώρα.
Παραθέτουμε δύο αποσπάσματα. Το πρώτο είναι η κριτική της JPM στα πολιτικά συστήματα της “περιφέρειας της ευρωζώνης”, τα οποία είναι πολύ πιο δημοκρατικά από όσο πρέπει για να προχωρήσει η αναδιάρθρωση. Το δεύτερο είναι οι εκτιμήσεις τους για τα δύο πιθανά σενάρια συνέχισης της αναδιάρθρωσης. Ιδού:
The journey of national political reform
At the start of the crisis, it was generally assumed that the national legacy problems were economic in nature. But, as the crisis has evolved, it has become apparent that there are deep seated political problems in the periphery, which, in our view, need to change if EMU is going to function properly in the long run. The political systems in the periphery were established in the aftermath of dictatorship, and were defined by that experience. Constitutions tend to show a strong socialist influence, reflecting the political strength that left wing parties gained after the defeat of fascism. Political systems around the periphery typically display several of the following features: weak executives; weak central states relative to regions; constitutional protection of labor rights; consensus building systems which foster political clientalism; and the right to protest if unwelcome changes are made to the political status quo. The shortcomings of this political legacy have been revealed by the crisis. Countries around the periphery have only been partially successful in producing fiscal and economic reform agendas, with governments constrained by constitutions (Portugal), powerful regions (Spain), and the rise of populist parties (Italy and Greece). There is a growing recognition of the extent of this problem, both in the core and in the periphery. Change is beginning to take place. Spain took steps to address some of the contradictions of the post-Franco settlement with last year’s legislation enabling closer fiscal oversight of the regions. But, outside Spain little has happened thus far. The key test in the coming year will be in Italy, where the new government clearly has an opportunity to engage in meaningful political reform. But, in terms of the idea of a journey, the process of political reform has barely begun.
Most likely, these journeys at the national level don’t need to be completed in full in order to achieve further steps toward integration, especially the creation of a banking union. That is likely to develop over the coming years, even if the national-level journeys are still ongoing. But, for Germany to be comfortable, more progress needs to be made than we have seen thus far, in our view. But, some further steps of integration—such as a fiscal union which could support Eurobonds—would likely require even more progress, especially in terms of national level political reform. In our view, it is unlikely that Germany would agree to Eurobonds without a significant change in political constitutions around the periphery.
The other trigger of a shift to a new narrative would be if social dislocation in the Euro area were judged to have passed some form of tipping point. At present this appears unlikely, but it is possible that reform fatigue could lead to i) the collapse of several reform minded governments in the European south, ii) a collapse in support for the Euro or the EU, iii) an outright electoral victory for radical anti-European parties somewhere in the region, or iv) the effective ungovernability of some Member States once social costs (particularly unemployment) pass a particular level. None of these developments look likely at the present time. But, the longer-term picture (beyond the next 18 months) is hard to predict, and a more pronounced backlash to the current approach to crisis management cannot be excluded.